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Phelps: Protecting the Opportunity Interest of the Unwed Fathers of Newbo

Protecting the Opportunity Interest of the Unwed
Fathers of Newborn Infants Placed for Adoption:
Does California's Statute Go Far Enough?
An adoption creates a new legal relationship between the adopting parents and the adopted child." It requires terminating the

child's relationship with his or her natural parents.'
In some cases, the child's natural parents may be deceased, and
there is no previous relationship to terminate. In other cases, a
court may find that the parents' rights should be terminated involuntarily, such as when the parents have abandoned or neglected
the child.3 In all other cases, one or both parents must consent

before their child can be adopted.4
Traditionally, when a married couple gives up their child for
adoption, the court requires the consent of both parents,' but
when an unmarried mother wishes to give up her child, only her
consent is required. 6 This is because the unwed father 7 is generally
considered to have no legal claim upon his child.'
In recent years, courts have begun to grant unwed fathers more
rights. Since 1972, the United States Supreme Court has issued
four decisions greatly expanding the rights of unwed fathers in the
adoption of their children.' The U.S. Supreme Court has stated
1. H.

CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

602

(1968).
2. Id. Of course, when a child who has previously been adopted is being adopted
again, it is the rights of the previous adoptive parents, and not the natural parents, that
must be terminated.
3. Id. at 629.
4. Id. at 623-26. In a step-parent adoption, only one parent is losing his or her parental rights, so only the consent of that one parent is needed.
5. Id. at 623.
6. Id. at 625.
7. The term "unwed father" will be used to refer to any father who has never been
married to the mother of the child or children in question. Such an "unwed father" could
be married to someone else.
8. H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 625.
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
These decisions are well known and have been widely written about. See Buchanan, The
ConstitutionalRights of Unwed FathersBefore and After Lehr v. Robinson, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 313 (1984); Note, Adoption: The Rights of the Putative Father,37 OKLA. L. REV. 583
(1984); Note, Delineationof the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights: a Psychological
Parenthood Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 290 (1985); Comment, Domestic Relations-ParentalRights of the Putative Father: Equal Protection and Due Process Considerations, 14 MEm. ST. U.L. REV. 259 (1984); Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed
Father: The Boundaries are Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445 (1980-81); Comment, Caban v.
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that every father has a unique opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his child.10 This has been
called his "opportunity interest.""1
The California Supreme Court considered the issue of an unwed father's opportunity interest in the 1984 case of In re Baby
Girl M.12 It held that where a father "pursue[s] custodial responsibility," and strangers seek to adopt the child, the father can not
be denied custody, unless it is shown that placing the child with
him would be a detriment to the child. a However, this decision
was based primarily on the court's interpretation of California
statutes, rather than on federal constitutional grounds. 4
In response, the California legislature amended the applicable
statute, 15 thereby effectively overruling Baby Girl M.'6 California
Civil Code Section 7017(d)(2) now states that an illegitimate
child can be adopted over the objections of his or her father" if
the adoption is in the best interests of the child.'"
The change in the California statute does not directly contraMohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers,46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 95 (1979);
Note, Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley v. Illinois: Caban v. Mohammed, 57 DEN. L.J.
671 (1980); Supreme Court Review-Caban v. Mohammed, Parham v. Hughes, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445, 459 (1980); Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed, but No Longer Unprotected, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 425 (1980); Note, Equal Protection and the Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes and Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. L.J. 717
(1980); Note, The Rights of Fathersof Non-Marital Children to Custody, Visitation, and
to Consent to Adoption, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 412 (1979); Note, Unwed Fathers: An
Analytical Survey of Their Parental Rights and Obligations, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029;
Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Equal Protection-Cabanv. Mohammed, 29 EMORY L.J. 833
(1980).
10. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
11. Buchanan, The ConstitutionalRights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 351-82 (1984). See also Baby Girl M. v. Edward M.,
37 Cal. 3d 65, 74, 688 P.2d 918, 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 315 (1984).
12. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984). This case
should not be confused with the famous New Jersey case with a similar name that dealt
with surrogate motherhood, In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
13. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 69-70, 688 P.2d at 921, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
14. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311. See infra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text.
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West 1987).
16. After the Baby Girl M. decision held that the section 4600 detriment standard
applies to section 7017 adoption hearings, the legislature amended section 7017 to read,
"[s]ection 4600 does not apply to this proceeding." (CAL. CIV. CODE, § 7017(d)(2).) See
infra notes 53-56 & 88-90 and accompanying text.
17. Unless the father is legally a "presumed father." See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
18. If the natural father.., claims parental rights, the court shall determine if
it is in the best interest of the child that the father retain his parental rights, or
that an adoption of the child be allowed to proceed.... If the court finds that...
it is in the child's best interest that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it shall
order that [the father's] consent is not required for an adoption; such a finding
terminates all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.
CAL CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2).
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dict any of the four U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the subject.19 However, dicta in the Supreme Court decisions suggests
that the Court might require more protection for an unwed father's opportunity interest than the California statute grants. The
purpose of this Comment is to analyze the constitutionality of the
California statute and to evaluate the alternatives the California
legislature has available in view of the statute's possible unconstitutionality. Section One discusses the current rights of unwed fathers in California by both statute and case law. Section Two examines the Supreme Court case law on the constitutional rights of
unwed fathers. Section Three compares the statutory rights of unwed fathers in California to the rights those fathers have under
Supreme Court decisions. Finally, Section Four discusses the alternatives available to the legislature and the courts if a conflict
arises between the California statutes and the United States Supreme Court decisions.
I.

THE CURRENT RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS IN CALIFORNIA

A.

California'sDistinction Between "Natural"and
"Presumed" Fathers

In 1975, California enacted the Uniform Parentage Act."0 One
of the goals of this act was to eliminate the distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children.21 California Civil Code Section 7002 states that: "The parent and child relationship extends
equally to every child and'22
to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
However, the act does make a distinction between "presumed"
fathers and "natural" fathers, which is similar to the distinction
between fathers of legitimate children and fathers of illegitimate
children. 23 Presumed fathers2 4 include any man who is or was
19. See supra note 9.
20. CAL CIV. CODE §§ 7000-21 (West 1987). This statute was passed in 1975 and
took effect on January 1, 1976.
21. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7002 (West 1987).
23. The definition given in the code actually distinguishes between a man who "is
presumed to be the natural father" and the other fathers. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a). Case
law has established "natural" fathers and "presumed" fathers as two separate classes. See
infra note 27. Some sections of the code now use the terms "natural" father and "presumed" fathers to refer to these separate classes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)(1)
and § 7017(d)(1).
24. The term "presumed father" does not denote a presumption in an evidentiary
sense. Even a man who can show indisputably that he is the biological father of a child
may not be a presumed father. W.E.J. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 3d
303, 308, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (1980).
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married to the child's mother,2 5 as well as men who have never
been married to the child's mother but who have "entered into
some family relationship with the mother and child. '26 Natural
fathers are those fathers who have not entered into such a
relationship.
A presumed father has as much right to custody of his child as
the child's mother does, but a natural father does not have this
same right.2" Similarly, in an adoption, a presumed father has the
same right to veto the adoption that the mother has, but a natural

father does not have this veto power.29
The conditions a man must meet to become a presumed father
are set forth in California Civil Code Section 7004.30 Of the four
25. CAL CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(1).
26. W.E.J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 867. See also CAL Civ.
CODE § 7004(a).
27. W.E.J., 100 Cal. App. 3d at 311, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 867. Logically, presumed
fathers are one subcategory of natural fathers. The term "natural father" could be used to
include both fathers who are presumed fathers, and those who are not presumed fathers.
However, the courts use the terms "natural" father and "presumed" father for two different, mutually exclusive, classes of fathers. That is, those fathers who are presumed fathers
are not natural fathers, and vice versa. This Comment will follow the courts' convention.
See, e.g., Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 72 n.5, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314;
Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (1978); Michael
U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 790 n.1, 705 P.2d 362, 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 41 (1985).
In at least one case, the term "biological" father is used instead of "natural" father to
denote a father who is not a presumed father. See W.E.J. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 305, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863-64 (1980).
28. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 72, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
29. Id.
30. CAL CIv. CODE § 7004(a) (West 1987) states in part:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the conditions
as set forth in Section 621 of the Evidence Code or in any of the following
paragraphs:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other
and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a
decree of separation is entered by a court.
(2) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to
marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law,
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and,
(i) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by a court, the
child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; or
(ii) If the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is born
within 300 days after the termination of cohabitation.
(3) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or
attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance
with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and
(i) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate, or
(ii) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by
court order.
(4) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child.
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possible ways a man can become a presumed father, only three
require that he marry the child's mother." The only way for a
man to become a presumed father without marrying the mother 32
is by "receiv[ing] the child into his home and openly hold[ing] out

the child as his natural child." 33
When the mother has custody of a child, the mother may prevent the child's father from becoming a presumed father by refusing to marry the father and refusing to allow the father to take

the child into his home. 4 A35California court has found that the
mother may legally do this.
B.

The Rights of Unwed Fathers Under CaliforniaStatutes
and California Court Decisions

One of the most important cases in California regarding the
rights of natural fathers, In re Baby Girl M., was decided by the

California Supreme Court in 1984.36
In this case, Edward, the baby's father, had dated the baby's
mother in the fall of 1980.37 Their relationship ended in November, before either of them knew that the mother had conceived a
child. The mother never let Edward know she was pregnant.3 " The
baby girl was born on July 18, 1981.30 The mother first placed the
baby in a foster home, and then formally relinquished her for
adoption on August 5th. °
(5) If the child was born and resides in a nation with which the United States
engages in an Orderly Departure Program or successor program, he acknowledges
that he is the child's father in a declaration under penalty of perjury, as specified
in Section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This paragraph [(5)] shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1997, and on
that date shall become inoperative.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(l)(5) (West Supp. 1988).
For situations covered by new subsection (5), the arguments made in this Comment do
not apply. However, because this subsection by its terms applies only to a very limited
situation, for a limited period of time, it does not have any general application to the problem presented in this Comment.
31. If the father marries the mother in a wedding "solemnized in apparent compliance with law," but that marriage is later found invalid, this can still be enough to establish that the father is a presumed father, notwithstanding the fact that the mother and
father were never technically married. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a) (1)-(3).
32. Or attempting to marry the mother in a ceremony later found invalid. See supra
note 30.
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(a)(4).
34. Adoption of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126
(1978).
35. Id.
36. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
37. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Edward first found out about the child on August 1st.4 1 He immediately contacted the Department of Social Welfare. On August 17th he visited the child at the agency offices and requested
that he be granted custody."2 Instead, the child
was placed with
43
prospective adoptive parents on August 24th.
The following December, a hearing was held to determine
whether Edward's parental rights should be terminated. The trial
court found that Edward was the biological father, and that he
could provide a good, loving home for his child. 44 The court specifically found that it would not be detrimental to the child to
place her with Edward.45 Nevertheless, the court held that it was
in the best interests of the child for her to remain with her adop47
tive parents, 4 and so the court terminated Edward's rights.
The hearing to determine whether Edward's parental rights
should be terminated was held pursuant to Section 7017.48 This
section defines a father's rights when the mother relinquishes his
child for adoption. Until it was amended in 1987, 49 this section
contained little language protecting natural fathers' rights. Section 7017 (d) stated, in relevant part:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the
41. Id.
42. Id. The dissent points out that Edward was not as eager for custody as the majority would make it appear. The first time Edward met with a social worker about the
child, he stated he did not want custody of the child, but suggested that she be adopted by
a family he knew. Then on August 10th, the day a petition was filed to terminate Edward's
rights, he met with the social worker again, and still did not express any desire for custody.
Id. at 76, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Still, Edward expressed an interest in the child from the first time he found out she
existed, and requested custody less than a month after the child was born. Edward's initial
hesitation did not play any role in the majority's decision. Even the dissent did not attach
great legal significance to it. For that reason, this Comment will treat the situation in Baby
Girl M. as one where the father took every reasonable legal action available to preserve his
rights as the child's father.
43. Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. It is not clear why the court reached this conclusion. The dissent says that "[t]he
mother signed the relinquishment only on condition that custody be transferred to the two
parent family," and that the welfare department "implied that it would permit her to withdraw her consent if this condition [were] not fulfilled." Id. at 77, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The majority merely states that the mother "wished
the child [be] placed with a family neither [she nor Edward] knew." Id. at 68, 688 P.2d at
920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311. Neither the dissent nor the majority explain whether the
mother would have been allowed to withdraw her consent at this time, or for this reason.
There are other possible reasons why the court did not award the child to Edward. Perhaps the court did not wish to move the child from the home where she had already lived
for several months, or perhaps the court preferred two-parent families. The records from
the higher courts do not include this information.
47. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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natural father, claims custodial rights, the court shall proceed to
determine parentage and custodial rights in whatever order the
court deems proper. If the court finds that the man representing
himself to be the natural father is a presumed father under subdivision (a) of section 7004, then the court shall issue an order
providing that the father's consent shall be required for an adoption of the child. In all other cases, the court shall issue an order
providing that only the mother's consent shall be required for
the adoption of the child.50
Prior to 1984, courts did not require any special standard for
terminating a natural father's parental rights.51 The courts did not
stated that
require this because the statutory language clearly
"only the mother's consent shall be required." 52
In Baby Girl M., the California Supreme Court held that the
parental rights of a natural father cannot be terminated unless the
court finds that placing the child with him would be a detriment
to the child.5" It reached this decision by applying the rule of section 4600, which applies to custody hearings, to section 7017(d).5 4
Section 4600 states that the court may not give custody of a child
to a nonparent unless it has found that placing the child with a
parent would be detrimental to the child.55 On the basis of section
4600, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case of Baby Girl M., with instructions that Edward's parental
rights could be terminated only if it were found that placing the
child with him would be a detriment to the child.56
This decision was a victory for unwed fathers who wanted to
develop a relationship with their children. Although the parental
rights of such fathers were still less than the rights of the children's mothers, 57 at least these fathers were protected.58 If the
§ 7017(d) (as amended, 1987) (emphasis added).

50.

CAL. CIv. CODE

51.

Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 72, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (disap-

proving such language in W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 305, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 862, 863-64 (1980)).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (as amended, 1987).

53. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
54. Id.
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(c). This section states, in relevant part, that:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other

than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.

56. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 76, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317. On
remand, the trial court found that, although the father was not unfit, it would still be a
detriment to the child to remove her at the age of five from the only family she had ever
known. Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786, 789-90, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1987).
The father appealed again, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 795, 236 Cal. Rptr.

666. This appellate court opinion was ordered unpublished.
57. For example, "if the father is merely a natural father and not a presumed father,
the mother alone is entitled to the child's custody." Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 72, 688

P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
58.

Id. at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
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mother did not want the child, and the father was not so unfit as
to be a detriment to the child, then the father would be entitled to
custody.59
However, this decision seems strained for two reasons. First, as
the dissent in that case pointed out: "[SIection 7017, subdivision
(d), is inconsistent with section 4600, subdivision (c). While the
former provides that the consent of the natural father to an adoption is not required, the latter states that a father's consent to the
adoption is necessary unless the court makes a finding of detriment."' 0 There seems to be no reason for preferring section 4600
over section 7017. Section 4600 is the older statute, passed in
1969, as part of a title dealing primarily with marriage and divorce."1 Section 7017 was passed in 1975 as part of the Uniform
Parentage Act, and deals precisely with the matter in question.
The majority justified its decision by referring to the legislative
history, where it claimed that "the Legislature has declined its
opportunity to disprove application of the section 4600 standard to
section 7017 hearings."62 The dissent stated that the conclusion of
the majority, "can only be reached by disregarding the critical
provisions of
section 7017. This is precisely what the majority cav63
alierly do."1
The second reason this decision seems strained is that it gave a
natural father the same veto power over an adoption that a presumed father has. 6 ' The majority conceded that the legislature intended to differentiate between the veto power given to mothers
and presumed fathers, and the lesser rights given to natural fathers."5 The majority stated that it was not giving the natural father a veto over the adoption of his child, because his rights could
be terminated if it would be detrimental for the child to be placed
with him.66 The dissent noted that a mother or a presumed father
59. Id.
60. Id. at 81, 688 P.2d at 929, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
61. Section 4600 is part of Title 4, Part 5, "The Family Law Act." The first five
titles of this part are: "Marriage," "General Provisions," "Judicial Determination of Void
or Voidable Marriage," "Dissolution of Marriage," and "Custody of Children."
62. A bill introduced in the assembly had declared that the "parental preference" in
section 4600 would not apply to alleged fathers seeking custody under section 7017. This
bill was passed by both houses, but the Governor vetoed it because of certain financial
provisions in it. This language was later amended into another bill, but after discussion it
was amended out again. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 71, 688 P.2d at 922, 207 Cal. Rptr.
at 313.
63. Id. at 77, 688 P.2d at 926, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 78, 688 P.2d at 927, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 318 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 72, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
66. Id. at 72-73, 688 P.2d at 923, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 314.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/6

8

1988]

Phelps: Protecting the Opportunity Interest of the Unwed Fathers of Newbo
OPPORTUNITY INTEREST OF UNWED FATHERS 131

would similarly have their rights terminated if placing the child
with them would be a detriment to the child.67 Thus, the majority's decision makes all three situations essentially identical.
The California Supreme Court retreated somewhat from the
Baby Girl M. decision the next year in the case of Michael U. v.

Jamie B.6 a This was another case where a mother wished to place
her baby
for adoption, but the father wanted custody of the child
69
himself
The father in that case, Michael U., was only 16 years old at
the time the baby was conceived, 70 and the mother, Jamie B., was
only 12.71 Michael testified that he wanted to keep the baby from
the moment he knew Jamie was pregnant. 72 Both before and after
the baby's birth, Michael and his mother repeatedly indicated to

Jamie and her mother that they wanted to raise the child.7a
The court held that Michael "is entitled to the parental preference established by Civil Code section 4600, and to custody unless
such an award would be detrimental to the child. '' 74 However, the
court awarded the child to the adoptive parents. 75 The court considered that it would be a detriment to remove the baby from the
home where he had lived for five months, because the baby had
established an emotional attachment to the adoptive parents.78
The court also considered Michael's personal characteristics, noting that he was "an unemployed high school student whose social
and sexual relationships and academic record demonstrate his lack
of maturity and judgment. ' 77 The court stated that even if

67. Id. at 78, 688 P.2d at 927, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 318 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
68. 39 Cal. 3d 780, 798, 705 P.2d 362, 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 46 (1985) (Reynoso,
J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 790, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The proceeding was initially
about temporary custody of the child, but the court recognized that if the father got temporary custody, this would probably determine the outcome of the entire case, because he
would then qualify as a presumed father (see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text).
Id. at 791, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
70. Id. at 790, 705 P.2d at 364, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 799, 705 P.2d at 370, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
73. Id. Michael took a community college course in child development. Id. at 794,
705 P.2d at 367, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 43. There was conflicting evidence as to whether
Michael and his family offered to pay for the expenses of Jamie's delivery. Jamie's mother
testified that there were no expenses, because the entire delivery was covered by their existing Kaiser insurance. Id. at 799, 705 P.2d at 370, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 47. (Reynoso, J.,
dissenting.)
74. Id. at 795, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
75. Id. at 795-56, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
76. Id. at 795, 705 P.2d at 367, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
77. Id. at 796, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44. The record did show that
Michael had serious problems. This included having sex with at least three teen-age and
pre-teen girls, smoking marijuana, and fighting at school. Id. at 793-94, 705 P.2d at 366,
218 Cal. Rptr. at 43. Michael did not have enough school credits to graduate from high
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Michael and his mother could jointly provide a good home for the
baby, Michael would be entitled to leave home when he became
an adult, and take the baby with him, which might inflict further
harm on the baby. 8
In a footnote, the court stated:
We do not imply that Michael is "unfit" in the sense that, if he
received custody of [the baby], the state would have grounds to
intervene and remove the child.... [I]t might also be detrimen-

tal to place [a child] with a parent who is not unfit, depending
upon the child's current circumstances and the available placement alternatives.7
Although the court claimed to use the "detriment" standard, it
gave lower courts considerable freedom in deciding what a detriment was.
Two concurring opinions favored abandoning the detriment
standard altogether. Justice Kaus thought the court should "rectify the mistake" of Baby Girl M.,80 and apply "the standard
which ought to govern-'what disposition is in the best interest of
the child?' "81 Justice Mosk stated that "[w]e should reconsider
the Baby Girl M. decision, 8 2 and "return to the traditional
rule,"83 and that the court should "consider only the best interest
of the child. 84
A dissent by Justice Reynoso, in which Chief Justice Bird
joined, reiterated the Baby Girl M. holding,85 and stated that:
"[t]he natural father's opportunity to establish a protected relationship with his child must prevail in the absence of his unfitness."8 This opinion further stated that the majority decision
weakened the Baby Girl M. guidelines, which was
"unfortunate."8' 7
Whether or not the guidelines of Baby Girl M. were "weakened," the California Supreme Court twice stated that unwed fathers were entitled to the parental preference of section 4600.88
school with his class, and was attempting to acquire sufficient credits through a home study
program. Id. at 794, 705 P.2d at 366, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
78. Id. at 796, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
79. Id. at 796, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.8.
80. Id. at 797, 705 P.2d at 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Kaus, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 797, 705 P.2d at 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Mosk, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 800, 705 P.2d at 371, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (quoting Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 75, 688 P.2d at 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. at
316, which in turn was quoting Buchanan, supra note 11, at 373 (brackets and quotation
marks omitted)).
87. Id. at 798, 705 P.2d at 369, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Reynoso, J., dissenting).
88. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 68, 688 P.2d at 920, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 311; Michael
U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 780, 795, 705 P.2d 362, 368, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (1985).
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The Legislature responded to the California Supreme Court's decisions by amending section 7017, so that section 4600 specifically
does not apply to it. 9 Section 7017 (d) (2), as amended in 1986,
now states:
If the natural father ... claims parental rights, the court shall
determine ... if it is in the best interest of the child that the
father retain his parental rights, or that an adoption ... be allowed to proceed. The court, in making the determination, may
consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by the
father to obtain custody, the age and prior placement of the
child, and the effects of a change of placement on the child....
[S]ection 4600 does not apply to this proceeding. Nothing in
this section changes the rights of a presumed father."'
This amendment terminated the rights granted to natural fathers by the California Supreme Court's Baby Girl M. decision.
In factual situations similar to Baby Girl M., trial courts can once
again use their own judgment as to whether it is better for the
child to be with his or her father, or be adopted by other persons.
II.

DECISIONS BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS

In addition to the rights that unwed fathers have under state
law, unwed fathers in California also have the rights that the
United States Constitution grants to all Americans. The United
States Supreme Court has decided four cases defining the consitutional rights of unwed fathers where the state seeks to terminate
their relationships with their children. 91 None of these cases had a
fact situation like the one in Baby Girl M., where a father of a
newborn baby had taken every reasonable step to preserve his
rights.
The first of the four cases, Stanley v. Illinois,92 was decided in
1972. In this case, Peter Stanley lived with the mother of his three
children intermittently for 18 years.9 Stanley claimed that he
"loved, cared for, and supported [his] children from the time of
their birth until the death of their mother. '94 After the mother
died, the state of Illinois initiated a dependency proceeding where
the children95 were declared wards of the state and placed with
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2).
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Buchanan, supra note 11, at 319.
92. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
93. Id. at 646.
94. Id. at 666 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

95.

Only two of the three children were involved in this case. Id. at 646. The oldest

of the children had already been made a ward of the state pursuant to a neglect proceed-

ing, at a time when the juvenile court mistakenly believed that Stanley was married to the
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court-appointed guardians.9 6 Stanley appealed on the grounds that
his children had been taken from him 97 without any finding that
he was an unfit parent.9 8 Such a finding would have been required
under Illinois law to take children from a married parent or an
unwed mother. 99
The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the taking of his
children was a violation of Stanley's fourteenth amendment right
to due process.10 0 It held that Stanley had a "cognizable and substantial" interest in retaining custody of his children. 10 1 The Court
held that, "as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled
to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were
'0 2
taken from him.'
The Court also considered whether this finding violated Stanley's fourteenth amendment right to equal protection. 0 3 It noted
that Illinois did not treat all parents equally because it denied a
hearing to unwed fathers, while granting one to all other parents
where custody of their children was challenged. 0 It found that
such unequal treatment was unconstitutional. 0 5
The Stanley case left three important questions unanswered:
(1) was Stanley merely entitled to a hearing, using whatever standard the state might choose? (2) was Stanley entitled to be heard
using the same standard applied to a married parent? and (3) did
this right to a hearing apply to all unmarried fathers, or just to
those who had custody of their children?"0 '
More light was shed on these questions when the Supreme
Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott.10 In that case, the father,
Leon Quilloin, had never lived with his illegitimate child, nor with
the child's mother. 0 8 He visited his child on many occasions, but
provided support for his child only on an irregular basis.'0 9 The
child's mother. Id. at 667 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

96. Id. at 646.
97. Actually, the children were not physically taken from him. Shortly after the
death of the mother, Stanley had placed the children in the care of a married couple he
knew. Id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that Stanley's main concern was that he would lose his welfare payments if someone else was designated as the
children's guardian. Id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).

98. Id. at 646.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 657-58.
101. Id.at 652.
102. Id.at 649.
103. Id.
104.

Id. at 658.

105. Id.
106.
107.

Buchanan, supra note 11, at 330.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).

108. Id.at 247.
109. Id.at 251.
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mother later married another man. When the child was eleven
years old, the mother wished to have the step-father adopt the
child.110 Quilloin attempted to prevent the step-father from adopting the child.111 The Georgia court did not find Quilloin
to be an
12
unfit parent, but nevertheless granted the adoption.
Quilloin's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was based on a
claim that his right to equal protection had been violated because
he was not given the same treatment as a married father.11 ' He
asserted that his interests in his child were the same as the interests of a father who had been married to the child's mother but
was divorced.11 4 Under Georgia law, a divorced father would have
been granted an absolute veto over the adoption of his child, unless he were found to be unfit.11 "
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that
Quilloin's interests were readily distinguishable from those of a
separated or divorced father, and therefore the state was not required to give him the same veto power it granted to divorced or
separated fathers."1 The Court noted that Quilloin
has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and
thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of
the child. Appellant does not complain of his exemption from
these responsibilities
and, indeed, he does not even now seek cus117
tody of his child.
The Court found that legal custody of children is a central aspect
of marriage, and therefore every married father takes full responsibility for the care of his child. 1 " For this reason, the state is
allowed to draw a distinction between fathers who had never married, and fathers who were formerly married; based on their commitment to the welfare of the child. 1 9 Thus Quilloin clearly
shows that not all unmarried fathers are entitled to be heard using
the same standard that would apply to fathers who had been married to the mother of their child.
The third case was Caban v. Mohammed.120 This case held that
the "undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and un110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id.
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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wed fathers," in all adoption cases, denied fathers their right to
equal protection.12 '
In Caban, Abdiel Caban lived with the mother of his children
during the years his children were born and contributed to the
children's support.' 22 Later, Caban separated from the children's
mother; but while Caban, the mother, and the children were all
living in New York, Caban was still able to see the children regularly.123 Then the children went to live with their maternal grandmother in Puerto Rico. 2 4 Caban physically obtained the children
from the grandmother by claiming that he would only be visiting
them for a few days. 25 Caban then took the children with him to
New York and kept them there. 26 The mother tried to27 retrieve
the children, but Caban would not return them to her.
The mother, together with her new husband, Kazim Mohammed, filed a petition to adopt the children. 12 Caban and his new
wife filed a cross-petition to adopt the children themselves.' 9 The
trial court found that Caban was foreclosed from adopting the
children because, under New York law, the mother's consent was
required, and the mother withheld her consent. 30 On the other
hand, an unwed father's consent was not required. The court gave
Caban an opportunity to be heard, but only to challenge the
Mohammeds' qualifications. 3 ' The New York courts allowed the
Mohammeds 3to2 adopt the children, thus terminating Caban's parental rights.1
The U.S. Supreme Court treated Caban as a sex-discrimination
case. It ruled the New York statute was unconstitutional in requiring the mother's consent but not the father's in a case such as
this. 13 3 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated: "Genderbased distinctions 'must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Pro121. Id. at 394.
122. Id. at 382.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 383.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. It may seem strange that the mother was adopting her own child, but in a
footnote the Court explained that a New York statute allowed a husband and wife together
to adopt the child of either of them. That statute allowed a natural mother to adopt her
own illegitimate child. Id. at 383 n.1.
129. Id. at 383.
130. Id. at 384.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 383-84.
133. Id. at 382.
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tection Clause.' 1

4

137

In a case such as this, where the father has "a

relationship fully comparable to that of the mother,"' a3 the distinction between the father and the mother does not bear a substantial relation to the state's interests. 136
As the majority admitted, and Justice Steven's dissent emphasized, this decision applies to the special case of older children
who have a substantial relationship with their father. 37 Because a
newborn infant does not have a substantial relationship with its
father, the same reasoning might not apply.
The most recent of the four cases, Lehr v. Robertson,'38 dealt
with a newborn infant. This case held that where one parent has
established a legal relationship with the child, and the other parent has not, the state may treat the two parents differently.

39

In Lehr, the father, Jonathan Lehr, lived with the mother
before their child was born, and visited the mother and child every
day at the hospital following the child's birth.

40

For the next two

years, the mother tried to hide herself and the baby from Lehr,
but Lehr continually tried to locate them.' 41 On those occasions
when Lehr was able to find them, he visited with them to the ex-

tent the mother permitted.' 4 2 Finally, the mother threatened to
43
have Lehr arrested unless he stayed away.

In December 1979, shortly after the child's second birthday,
Lehr hired an attorney and threatened the mother with legal action if she would not let him visit the child.14 Later that same
month, the mother and her new husband filed a petition to have
the step-father adopt the child.'4 5 The next month, Lehr, who had

no notice of the mother's petition, filed his own paternity petition,
which included a request for visitation privileges and an order of
support.'4" The mother's attorney then received notice of Lehr's
petition, and informed the court in the jurisdiction where the
mother's petition was filed.'

47

That court proceeded to grant the

mother's petition and ordered the child adopted, in spite of Lehr's
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392-93 and id. at 416 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 268-69 (White, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 269 (White, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 252-53.
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did not give Lehr any nopending paternity action.1 4 The court
149
tice prior to the entry of that order.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.150
The trial court was not required to give Lehr notice because he
did not fall into any of the statutory categories of fathers who
were to be given notice.1 1 Furthermore, it had been entirely
within Lehr's control to become a member of at least one of these
classes; if he had simply mailed a post card to New York's putative father registry, he would have been given notice of any proceeding to adopt his child. 52 It was irrelevant that Lehr may have
failed to mail such a post card because he was ignorant of the
law.153 The Court found that "[the constitution does not require
either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties
who are presumably capable of asserting and protecting their own
rights." 154
The Supreme Court considered whether New York had violated
Lehr's right to due process.' 55 The Court noted that the Constitution does protect certain family relationships. 156 However, it also
stated that "the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.' 57 "Parental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent
and child.' 58 Lehr did not merit a fully protected relationship
with his child merely by being the child's biological father. 5 9
This does not mean that Lehr's biological relationship to his
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 265. At the time the adoption order was entered in this case, the applica-

ble New York law required that notice be given to those who had been adjudicated to be

the father; those who had been identified as the father on the child's birth certificate; those
who had lived openly with the child and the child's mother and who held themselves out to
be the father; those who had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written
statement; those who were married to the child's mother before the child was six months
old; and fathers who had demonstrated to the putative father registry their intent to claim
paternity of a child born out of wedlock. Id. at 250-51.
152.
153.

Id. at 264.
Id.

154. Id. at 265.
155. Id. at 256. It stated:
[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When that Clause is invoked
in a novel context, it is our practice to begin the inquiry with a determination of
the precise nature of the private interest that is threatened by the State.

156. Id. at 257.
157. Id.
158.

Id. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart,

J., dissenting)).
159.

Id. at 261.
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child is without significance.600 The Court stated that: "The natural father [has] an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship."' 6 '
This opportunity for a father to develop a relationship with his
child has since been labelled the father's "opportunity interest."' 2
When the Court considered whether Lehr's right to due process
had been violated, the question was whether New York had adequately protected his opportunity interest to form a relationship
with his child. 63
The right to receive notice was entirely within Lehr's control,
because he could have sent a post card to the putative father registry.16 4 The Court implies that if Lehr had mailed in a post card,
this would have not only given Lehr the right to notice, but would
have also established a protected relationship. 65 The Court found
that "the New York statute adequately protected [Lehr's] inchoate interest in establishing a relationship" with his child. 6 6
The Court also considered Lehr's claim that he was denied
equal protection. 167 The Court reiterated the Caban rule that statutes which require an unmarried mother's consent for adoption,
but not an unmarried father's consent, are unconstitutional where
the mother and father are similarly situated.'6 8 However, the
Court also cited its Quilloin decision, holding that "the existence
or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and
child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the
parents and the best interests of the child.' 6 9
Lehr had attempted to establish a relationship with his child,
by, among other things, petitioning the court to order him to support the child. 7 0 However, Lehr did not take the one additional
step that would have legally demonstrated his intent to claim paternity, which was sending a post card to the state's putative fa160.
161.
162.
688 P.2d
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Buchanan, supra note 11, at 352. See also Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 74,
918, 924, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 315 (1984).
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 252.
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ther registry.'1 ' Because Lehr had not established a legal relationship with the child, and because the mother did have a legal
relationship with the child, the state had a right to treat the
child's parents differently. 2
In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has greatly clarified the
rights of unwed fathers in the last sixteen years. The Court has
held that in some cases, an unwed father's relationship with his
children is entitled to due process protection, 7 a but that an unwed
father is not always entitled to the same protection as a father
who has married the children's mother. 74 It has also held that a
state cannot arbitrarily grant an unwed father less protection than
an unwed mother, 1 5 but that a state can treat unwed mothers and
unwed fathers differently when the father does not take the steps
necessary to establish a legal relationship with his child. 7 But the
Supreme Court has still not ruled on whether the unwed father of
a newborn infant has a constitutionally protected right to form a
relationship with his child.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S PROTECTION OF THE
OPPORTUNITY INTEREST OF UNWED FATHERS IN VIEW OF
RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. A Comparison of the Results Reached Under CaliforniaStatutes and Under United States Supreme Court Guidelines
In general, the California statutes grant an unmarried father
the same rights as in the U.S. Supreme Court cases discussed
above. When a father takes his child into his home and holds the
child out as his own, California considers him to be a presumed
father, 7 and gives him the same rights as the mother in an adoption proceeding. 78 In Stanley and Caban, the fathers had lived
with their children.' 79 Thus, if these cases had arisen in California, the California courts would have granted these fathers the
same rights as the mothers; they would have received at least as
much protection as the U.S. Supreme Court granted. 80
171. Id. at 250-52.
172. Id. at 267-68.
173. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
174. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
175. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
176. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
177. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7004(a)(4).
178. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(a)(1) and (2).
179. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646; Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
180. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658, where the Supreme Court merely ordered that
Stanley be given a hearing as to his fitness before the children were removed from his
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In cases such as Quilloin and Lehr, where the fathers were
found to have no protected relationship with their children,181 a
California court would find these fathers not to be presumed fathers, but only natural fathers. California law would require that
such a father be given notice of a proceeding,"8 2 but his parental
rights would be terminated if it were in the best interest of the
child. 18a This meets the minimum standards set forth by the Supreme Court in these cases, which do not require that unwed fathers always be given the right to veto the adoption of their
children. 4
The possible problem arises in cases where a father has taken
every reasonable step to establish a relationship with his child, but
has been prevented from doing so. It is possible that such a father
would have a legally-protected "opportunity interest" in developing a relationship with his child.18 5
California makes little effort to protect this opportunity interest.
The natural father has a right to notice, 8 but if the court feels it
is in the child's best interest for another man to become the child's
father, the natural father's rights are terminated. 87 The United
States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the father's
opportunity interest, but some of the language used in the Supreme Court decisions suggests that California's statute does not
go far enough.
B.

The Father's Opportunity Interest and Equal Protection

Because California statutes do not give natural fathers the same
rights as mothers, there is a possibility that California's statute
may be discriminatory. In reviewing sexual discrimination cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a gender-based distinction
must not only "serve important governmental objectives," 1 8 but

must also "be substantially related to achievement of those

custody; and Caban, 441 U.S. at 382, which denied the states the right to make an undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers.
181. See supra notes 116-19 & 171-72 and accompanying text.
182.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§

7017(d)(1).

183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2).
184. See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256, finding that Quilloin had not been deprived of
his rights under the due process or equal protection clauses; and Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268,
holding that the equal protection clause does not prevent a state from according the two
parents different legal rights.
185. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.

186.
187.

CAL. CIV. CODE
CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 7017(d)(1).

§ 7017(d)(2).

188. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
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objectives."188

The Supreme Court has stated that "providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important" state interest.190 However, treating a child's father different than a child's mother is not
necessarily related to achieving that objective.191 For example, in
the Caban case, where the children were older and had been cared
for by both parents, the Court found that the state's distinction
between the mother and father did not bear any relation to the
state's interest.9 2
In Caban, Justice Stewart stated in his dissenting opinion that
"[w]hen men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the
area covered by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection
Clause is not violated,"' 93 and "[w]ith respect to a large group of
adoptions-those of newborn children and infants-unwed
mothers and unwed fathers are simply not similarly situated.' 94
The majority explicitly refused to express a view as to the equal
protection rights of a father of a newborn baby. 195 The Court left
open the possibility that a statute which granted mothers greater
rights than fathers in adoptions would be acceptable if it set forth
"more stringent requirements concerning the acknowledgment of
paternity or a stricter definition of abandonment."' 96
Perhaps California's distinction between presumed fathers and
natural fathers would be construed as merely a stringent requirement for determining which fathers have properly acknowledged
their children. 97 Seen in this way, California's statute is a proper
way to determine which fathers have rights equal to the mother's
in vetoing an adoption, and which fathers do not have this right.
But this is not accurate because where the court finds a man to be
the natural father of a child, and that man has made every effort
to care for his child, he can still be denied the rights of a presumed father. 98 As long as such fathers are not given the same
rights as the mother, the possibility remains that California's stat189. Id. This standard is stricter than the minimal scrutiny given to ordinary statutes, but not as strict as the strict scrutiny given to a statute which involves a "suspect
class" (such as race or national origin), or which impinge on a fundamental right. Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights of Unwed Fathers, supra note 9, at
105-08.
190. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
191. Id. at 391.
192. Id.
193. Id.at 388 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
194. Id. at 398-99 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
195. Id. at 392 n.11.
196. Id.
197. For a discussion of California's distinction between presumed fathers and natural fathers, see supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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ute may be a violation of the father's constitutional right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment.
C. The Father's Opportunity Interest and Due Process
The U.S. Supreme Court has "recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected."'19 If and when a relationship between a father
and his natural child develops, that relationship is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process.200
But the Court has not yet decided exactly how much protection
courts must give to the father's opportunity interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the biological connection between a parent and child is not enough to justify full constitutional protection.20x According to the Court, the significance
of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity he may grasp. 0 2 If the father uses this opportunity to
establish a relationship, and accepts responsibility, this will create
a constitutionally-protected parent-child relationship. 203
In Quilloin, the U.S. Supreme Court justified terminating the
father's rights because it was "not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his
child. 2 04 Quilloin had "never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child. ' 20 5 In other words, he had failed to grasp the
opportunity to establish a relationship.
But it is not enough for a father to attempt to establish a relationship. In Lehr, the father was clearly attempting to establish a
relationship with his child.20 6 The Court ruled that because he did
not send a post card to the putative father registry, Lehr had not
taken the steps required by law for him to receive notice. 2 7 But
more than failing to preserve his right to notice, the Court found
199.

Quillion, 434 U.S. at 255.

200.

Caban, 441 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoted with approval by the

majority opinion in Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260).

201. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoted with approval by the
majority opinion in Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260). But not all of the Justices have agreed with
this. In his dissent, which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined, Justice White stated,

"[a] 'mere biological relationship' is not as unimportant in determining the nature of lib-

erty interests as the majority suggests ....The 'biological connection' is itself a relation-

ship that creates a protected interest." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
202.
203.

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262-68.
Id.

204.

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).

205.

Id. at 256.

206. The judge who granted the step-father's adoption had actual knowledge that the
father's paternity petition was pending. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252.
207. Id. at 250-51.
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that Lehr had failed to establish a legal relationship with his
child.20 The Court particularly emphasized that this step was
completely within Lehr's control.20 9
In California, there are no means within the father's control to
become a presumed father.21 0 A natural father cannot establish a
relationship with his child or become a presumed father without
the mother's consent.211 The Court stated in Lehr, "[s]ince the
New York statutes adequately protected [the father's] interest in
establishing a relationship with [his child], we find no merit in the
claim that his constitutional rights were offended."2'12
Do the California statutes also adequately protect the father's
interest in establishing a relationship with his child? The statutes
do provide that a natural father shall be given notice,2 13 and his
rights will be terminated only if it is in the best interest of the
child to do so. 214 The trial court may consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody.215 No U.S. Supreme Court decision has explicitly held that
the father of a newborn is entitled to any greater rights than those
mentioned above.
A California Court of Appeal, however, held that a father has a
due process right, under the United States Constitution, which requires the application of the parental preference doctrine of section 4600 to cases where a mother wishes to place a newborn child
for adoption and the unwed father wants custody. 216 The court
stated that where the mother does not want physical custody herself, the father "may not be denied custody of his child or have his
parental rights terminated except upon a finding that leaving custody with [adoptive parents] is necessary to avert harm to the
child. 217
In Baby Girl M., the California Supreme Court also indicated
that a natural father is entitled to a higher level of protection.21 8
Although the court ostensibly based its conclusion on California
statutes,219 it included a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court deci208. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
209. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
210. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
212. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.
213. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(1).
214. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017(d)(2).
215. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d)(2).
216. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 22, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369
(1984).
217. Id.
218. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 75, 688 P.2d 918, 925, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 316
(1984). See also supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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sions regarding the rights of unwed fathers.2 In particular, it
quoted at length from a law review article analyzing those decisions, which said:
Recognition of an opportunity interest in unwed fathers requires
a conclusion that if the two elements of a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship are the biological link and commitment to and exercise of custodial responsibility, the state
may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a
protected custodial relationship. 21
The California Supreme Court concluded its discussion of the article by quoting the conclusion which stated that, where a child is
being adopted by strangers, and the father has attempted to pursue custodial responsibility, "the father's opportunity to establish
a protected relationship must prevail in the absence of his
unfitness. 22 2
This may explain why the California Supreme Court reached
the decision it did.223 Its interpretation of the California statutes
seemed to be forced. 24 But if this decision was actually an attempt to protect the opportunity interests of unwed fathers on
constitutional grounds, then it makes more sense. By claiming to
base its decision on independent state grounds, the California Supreme Court prevented the U.S. Supreme Court from hearing the
case on appeal.2 25
The California Supreme Court, by nominally basing its decision
on California statutes, risked that the California legislature might
change the law by amending the relevant statute. This amendment was exactly what happened.2 26 Now a child may once again
be adopted without his natural father's2 27consent if a court finds it
is in the child's best interest to do so.
In addition to the legislature's response, the lower courts also
took further action on the Baby Girl M. case. On remand, the
trial court once again decided against the natural father, and the
220. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 74-75, 688 P.2d at 924-25, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 31516.
221. Id. at 74, 688 P.2d at 924, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (quoting Buchanan, supra
note 11, at 351).
222. Buchanan, supra note 11, at 373.
223. The dissent noted, "[t]he majority strain mightily to support their untenable
result by an erroneous evaluation of United States Supreme Court decisions relating to
natural fathers." Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 81, 688 P.2d at 929, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 320
(Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
224. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
225. The United States Supreme Court will not review cases decided by state courts
if the decision of the state court is based on adequate and independent state grounds. Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
226. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
227.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§

7017(d).
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court of appeal
affirmed.22 8 This decision was ordered
229
unpublished.
In the unpublished appellate decision, the concurring opinion
stated unequivocally, "an unwed father has a constitutionally-protected, special, opportunity interest to establish a familial relationship with his child. '230 The concurring opinion claimed that
even the county, which opposed the father's right to veto the adoption, now conceded that the father originally "had a constitutional
right to develop an opportunity interest."'23x No reason was given
for ordering the decision unpublished, but perhaps it was to prevent language such as this from becoming precedent. 232
IV. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CALIFORNIA'S PROTECTION OF THE NATURAL FATHER'S
OPPORTUNITY INTEREST
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case
of Baby Girl M.233 There are strong arguments that the natural
father's opportunity interest is constitutionally protected,2 3 4 but
there are also strong counter-arguments that a natural father is
entitled to nothing more than the notice which California law already provides.235 If the U.S. Supreme Court finds the natural father's opportunity interest is constitutionally protected, the California legislature has two options.
The first is to return the law to the way it was immediately
228. Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786, 795, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 666 (1987). See
supra note 56.
229. See supra note 56.
230. Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 667. (Work, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in the original). The majority did not address this precise issue.
231. Id. at 798, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 668. (Work, J., concurring).
232. Rule 976(b) of the California Rules of Court states:
No opinion of a Court of Appeal or an appellate department of the superior court
may be published in the Official Reports unless the opinion: (1) establishes a new
rule of law, applies an existing rule to a set of facts significantly different from
those stated in published opinions, or modifies, or criticizes with reasons given, an
existing rule; (2) resolves or creates an apparent conflict in the law; (3) involves a
legal issue of continuing public interest; or (4) makes a significant contribution to
legal literature by reviewing either the development of a common law rule or the
legislative or judicial history of a provision of a constitution, statute, or other written law.
233. Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr 309 (1984), hearing
granted sub nom. McNamara v. County of San Diego, No. 87-5840 (April 18, 1988).
234. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. See also Justice White's dissenting opinion in Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272, mentioned supra at note 201.
235. "It is impossible to read the court's opinion in Lehr v. Robertson, and not recognize that due process requires nothing more than notification to the natural father that
his rights may be terminated." Baby Girl M., 37 Cal. 3d at 81, 688 P.2d at 929, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 320 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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following the California Supreme Court's Baby Girl M. ruling.2 36
In Baby Girl M., the California Supreme Court gave a natural
father the right to veto the adoption of his child when he wished
to have custody of the child himself, unless the court found that
placing the child with the father would be a detriment to the
child. Because this is essentially the same standard that applies to
the child's mother, this ruling gave the natural father at least as
much protection as the U.S. Supreme Court would require, and
probably more. However, this was not the result the legislature
desired.2 37 The legislature quickly changed the law, taking back a
significant part of the protection the court had given natural fathers. 238 Apparently the legislature wanted to provide more protection for the illegitimate children, because the law now states
that the best interest of the child is controlling. 3 9
The second alternative is to enlarge the definition of "presumed
father," so that it would be within a natural father's control to
become a presumed father. One way to do this would be to create
a "putative father registry," similar to the New York system referred to in Lehr.2 ° By registering with such an agency, a father
would have a means within his control of establishing a relationship with his child. This would satisfy the Supreme Court
guidelines. 41
Another way to give natural fathers the power to create a protected relationship with their children, which is more in keeping
with the spirit of California's distinction between "natural" and
"presumed" fathers, would be to add an additional way to become
presumed fathers based on the father's relationship with his child,
or his attempt to establish such a relationship. 4 2 For example, a
natural father might qualify if he openly acknowledges his paternity, and attempts to support the child and form a personal relationship with the child to the extent permitted by the child's
mother or guardian, and is willing to have custody of the child.
When the appellate court in Baby Girl M. awarded custody of
the child to the adoptive parents, it said, "while the rights of parents are important, our society is committed to the judgment that
236. 37 Cal. 3d 65, 688 P.2d 918, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1984).
237. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
239. "If the court finds that the man claiming parental rights is not the father, or
that if he is the father it is in the child's best interest that an adoption be allowed to
proceed, it shall order that that person's consent is not required for an adoption." CAL. CiV.
CODE § 7017(d)(2) (emphasis added).
240. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1983).
241. Id. at 263-64.
242. For the current way to become a presumed father, see supra note 30.
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the interests of children predominate."24 Yet it is only the natural
father whose rights can be terminated merely because it is in the
best interest of the child to do so.244 Natural mothers and presumed fathers are given greater protection.245 California statutes
still deny natural fathers the rights granted to all other parents. It
remains to be seen whether this is constitutional.
William G. Phelps*

243. Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786, 794, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660, 666 (1987). This
is an unpublished decision. See supra note 56.
244. CAL CIV. CODE § 7017.
245. Their children may be adopted without their consent only where an award of
custody to the parents would be detrimental to the child. CAL CiV. CODE § 4600(c). See
supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
* The author would like to thank Barbara Cox, Associate Professor, California
Western School of Law, for her help in editing this paper. Thanks, also, to Ann M.
Wheeler, former Associate Professor at California Western School of Law, for her guidance in the selection of this topic.
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